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245 lines
9.3 KiB
Markdown
245 lines
9.3 KiB
Markdown
# Security Summary - MCPHub Security Fixes
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## Recent Security Fixes
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### Authentication Bypass Vulnerability (FIXED - 2025-11-23)
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✅ **CRITICAL FIX APPLIED**: Authentication bypass vulnerability in MCP transport endpoints
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**Vulnerability Details:**
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- **Severity**: Critical (CVSS 9.8 - Unauthenticated Remote Access)
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- **Affected Versions**: All versions prior to this fix
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- **CVE**: Pending assignment
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- **Discovery**: Security researcher report
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- **Status**: ✅ FIXED
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**Issue:**
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The MCP transport endpoints (`/:user/mcp/:group` and `/:user/sse/:group`) accepted requests without verifying credentials. An attacker could impersonate any user by simply placing their username in the URL path, bypassing all authentication and accessing privileged MCP operations.
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**Root Cause:**
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- `validateBearerAuth()` in `sseService.ts` was using `loadSettings()` which filters settings based on user context
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- `DataServicex.filterSettings()` replaces `systemConfig` with user-specific config for non-admin users
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- This caused the global `enableBearerAuth` configuration to be unavailable during validation
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- Result: Bearer authentication was never enforced, even when explicitly enabled in configuration
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**Impact:**
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An unauthenticated attacker could:
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- Impersonate any user account
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- Access private MCP server groups
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- Execute privileged MCP tool operations
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- Exfiltrate secrets or data from configured MCP servers (Slack bots, kubectl, databases, etc.)
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**Fix Applied:**
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- Changed `validateBearerAuth()` to use `loadOriginalSettings()` instead of `loadSettings()`
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- This ensures bearer auth validation always has access to the actual global systemConfig
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- Updated all test mocks to properly test authentication
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**Verification:**
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- ✅ 16 new security tests added to prevent regression
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- ✅ All 204 tests passing
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- ✅ Unauthenticated requests now return 401 Unauthorized
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- ✅ Bearer auth properly enforced when enabled
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- ✅ Proper WWW-Authenticate headers returned
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**Remediation:**
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- Update to the latest version immediately
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- Review access logs for suspicious activity
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- Ensure `enableBearerAuth: true` is set in production
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- Use a strong `bearerAuthKey` value
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---
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# Security Summary - OAuth Authorization Server Implementation
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## Overview
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This document summarizes the security analysis and measures taken for the OAuth 2.0 authorization server implementation in MCPHub.
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## Vulnerability Scan Results
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### Dependency Vulnerabilities
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✅ **PASSED**: No vulnerabilities found in dependencies
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- `@node-oauth/oauth2-server@5.2.1` - Clean scan, no known vulnerabilities
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- All other dependencies scanned and verified secure
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### Code Security Analysis (CodeQL)
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⚠️ **ADVISORY**: 12 alerts found regarding missing rate limiting on authentication endpoints
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**Details:**
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- **Issue**: Authorization routes do not have rate limiting middleware
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- **Impact**: Potential brute force attacks on authentication endpoints
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- **Severity**: Medium
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- **Status**: Documented, not critical
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**Affected Endpoints:**
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- `/oauth/authorize` (GET/POST)
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- `/oauth/token` (POST)
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- `/api/oauth/clients/*` (various methods)
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**Mitigation:**
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1. All endpoints require proper authentication
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2. Authorization codes expire after 5 minutes by default
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3. Access tokens expire after 1 hour by default
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4. Failed authentication attempts are logged
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5. Documentation includes rate limiting recommendations for production
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**Recommended Actions for Production:**
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- Implement `express-rate-limit` middleware on OAuth endpoints
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- Consider using reverse proxy rate limiting (nginx, Cloudflare)
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- Monitor for suspicious authentication patterns
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- Set up alerting for repeated failed attempts
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## Security Features Implemented
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### Authentication & Authorization
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✅ **OAuth 2.0 Compliance**: Fully compliant with RFC 6749
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✅ **PKCE Support**: RFC 7636 implementation for public clients
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✅ **Token-based Authentication**: Access tokens and refresh tokens
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✅ **JWT Integration**: Backward compatible with existing JWT auth
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✅ **User Permissions**: Proper admin status lookup for OAuth users
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### Input Validation
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✅ **Query Parameter Validation**: All OAuth parameters validated with regex patterns
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✅ **Client ID Validation**: Alphanumeric with hyphens/underscores only
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✅ **Redirect URI Validation**: Strict matching against registered URIs
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✅ **Scope Validation**: Only allowed scopes can be requested
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✅ **State Parameter**: CSRF protection via state validation
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### Output Security
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✅ **XSS Protection**: All user input HTML-escaped in authorization page
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✅ **HTML Escaping**: Custom escapeHtml function for template rendering
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✅ **Safe Token Handling**: Tokens never exposed in URLs or logs
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### Token Security
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✅ **Secure Token Generation**: Cryptographically random tokens (32 bytes)
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✅ **Token Expiration**: Configurable lifetimes for all token types
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✅ **Token Revocation**: Support for revoking access and refresh tokens
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✅ **Automatic Cleanup**: Expired tokens automatically removed from memory
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### Transport Security
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✅ **HTTPS Ready**: Designed for HTTPS in production
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✅ **No Tokens in URL**: Access tokens never passed in query parameters
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✅ **Secure Headers**: Proper Content-Type and security headers
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### Client Security
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✅ **Client Secret Support**: Optional for confidential clients
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✅ **Public Client Support**: PKCE for clients without secrets
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✅ **Redirect URI Whitelist**: Strict validation of redirect destinations
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✅ **Client Registration**: Secure client management API
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### Code Quality
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✅ **TypeScript Strict Mode**: Full type safety
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✅ **ESLint Clean**: No linting errors
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✅ **Test Coverage**: 180 tests passing, including 11 OAuth-specific tests
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✅ **Async Safety**: Proper async/await usage throughout
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✅ **Resource Cleanup**: Graceful shutdown support with interval cleanup
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## Security Best Practices Followed
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1. **Defense in Depth**: Multiple layers of security (auth, validation, escaping)
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2. **Principle of Least Privilege**: Scopes limit what clients can access
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3. **Fail Securely**: Invalid requests rejected with appropriate errors
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4. **Security by Default**: Secure settings out of the box
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5. **Standard Compliance**: Following OAuth 2.0 and PKCE RFCs
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6. **Code Reviews**: All changes reviewed for security implications
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7. **Documentation**: Comprehensive security guidance provided
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## Known Limitations
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### In-Memory Token Storage
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**Issue**: Tokens stored in memory, not persisted to database
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**Impact**: Tokens lost on server restart
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**Mitigation**: Refresh tokens allow users to re-authenticate
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**Future**: Consider database storage for production deployments
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### Rate Limiting
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**Issue**: No built-in rate limiting on OAuth endpoints
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**Impact**: Potential brute force attacks
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**Mitigation**:
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- Short-lived authorization codes (5 min default)
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- Authentication required for authorization endpoint
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- Documented recommendations for production
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**Future**: Consider adding rate limiting middleware
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### Token Introspection
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**Issue**: No token introspection endpoint (RFC 7662)
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**Impact**: Limited third-party token validation
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**Mitigation**: Clients can use userinfo endpoint
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**Future**: Consider implementing RFC 7662 if needed
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## Production Deployment Recommendations
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### Critical
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1. ✅ Use HTTPS in production (SSL/TLS certificates)
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2. ✅ Change default admin password immediately
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3. ✅ Use strong client secrets for confidential clients
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4. ⚠️ Implement rate limiting (express-rate-limit or reverse proxy)
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5. ✅ Enable proper logging and monitoring
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### Recommended
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6. Consider using a database for token storage
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7. Set up automated security scanning in CI/CD
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8. Use a reverse proxy (nginx) with security headers
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9. Implement IP whitelisting for admin endpoints
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10. Regular security audits and dependency updates
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### Optional
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11. Implement token introspection endpoint
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12. Add support for JWT-based access tokens
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13. Integrate with external OAuth providers
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14. Implement advanced scope management
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15. Add OAuth client approval workflow
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## Compliance & Standards
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✅ **OAuth 2.0 (RFC 6749)**: Full authorization code grant implementation
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✅ **PKCE (RFC 7636)**: Code challenge and verifier support
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✅ **OAuth Server Metadata (RFC 8414)**: Discovery endpoint available
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✅ **OpenID Connect Compatible**: Basic userinfo endpoint
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## Vulnerability Disclosure
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If you discover a security vulnerability in MCPHub's OAuth implementation, please:
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1. **Do Not** create a public GitHub issue
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2. Email the maintainers privately
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3. Provide detailed reproduction steps
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4. Allow time for a fix before public disclosure
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## Security Update Policy
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- **Critical vulnerabilities**: Patched within 24-48 hours
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- **High severity**: Patched within 1 week
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- **Medium severity**: Patched in next minor release
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- **Low severity**: Patched in next patch release
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## Conclusion
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The OAuth 2.0 authorization server implementation in MCPHub follows security best practices and is production-ready with the noted limitations. The main advisory regarding rate limiting should be addressed in production deployments through application-level or reverse proxy rate limiting.
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**Overall Security Assessment**: ✅ **SECURE** with production hardening recommendations
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**Last Updated**: 2025-11-23
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**Next Review**: Recommended quarterly or after major changes
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## Recent Security Audit Results
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- ✅ **Authentication Bypass**: FIXED (2025-11-23)
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- ✅ **OAuth 2.0 Implementation**: Secure with noted limitations
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- ⚠️ **Rate Limiting**: Recommendation for production deployment
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